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Abstract. We describe the strategy of our negotiating agent, Nice Tit for Tat
Agent, which reached the ﬁnals of the 2011 Automated Negotiating Agent Com-
petition. It uses a Tit for Tat strategy to select its offers in a negotiation,i.e.: initially
it cooperates with its opponent, and in the following rounds of negotiation, it re-
sponds in kind to the opponent’sactions. We give an overview of how to implement
such a Tit for Tat strategy and discuss its merits in the setting of closed bilateral
negotiation.
1 Introduction
This paper presents a new negotiation strategy, called the Nice Tit for Tat Agent,
which we developed and entered into the Second Automated Negotiating Agent
Competition1 (ANAC2011). ANAC is a tournament between a set of negotiating
agents which perform closed bilateral negotiationusing the alternating offers proto-
col. The negotiation environment consists of multi-issue scenarios, and is closed in
the sense that there is uncertainty about the opponent’s preferences.
Our negotiation strategy is based on the principle of Tit for Tat: cooperating on
the ﬁrst move and then mirroring whatever the other player did in the preceding
round. Thus, Tit for Tat is a strategy of cooperation based on reciprocity [1].
Tit for Tat has been applied and foundsuccessful in many other games, including
the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. It is considered to be a very robust strategy,
mainly because of the following three features:
i. It is never the ﬁrst to defect (i.e., it plays nice as long as the the opponent plays
nice as well);
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ii. It can be provoked into retaliation by a defection of the opponent;
iii. However, it is forgiving after just one act of retaliation.
In this paper, we discuss how to implement such a Tit for Tat strategy in the setting
of closed bilateral negotiation.
2 A Tit for Tat Negotiation Strategy
We ﬁrst give a broad overview of the Tit for Tat negotiation strategy. The ideas
behind and details of implementation are given below.
The Nice Tit for Tat agent plays a tit for tat strategywith respect to its own utility.
The agent will initially cooperate, then respond in kind to the opponent’s previous
action, while aiming for the Nash point of the negotiationscenario.After each move
by the opponent, it updates its Bayesian opponent model to make sure it responds
with a nice move to a concession by the opponent.
2.1 Four Ways of Repaying the Favor
When implementing a Tit for Tat strategy, the ﬁrst question that needs answering is:
in what way should an agent reciprocate? In closed bilateral negotiation, there are
two utility functionsin play, one of which is unknownto the other agent. Therefore,
there are two different actions from the opponent that could be considered ‘nice’:
i. The opponent concedes according to its own utility function;
ii. The opponent offers more utility to the agent, according to the agent’s utility
function.
Both actions can be reciprocated by the agent by again choosing one of the two
options.Therefore,there are fourdifferentwaysfor a Tit for Tat agent to reciprocate
(see Fig. 1).
For the Tit For Tat agent, we have elected to reciprocate according to the agent’s
own utility function. That is, when the opponent makes a bid that is better for the
agent, in return, the agent will produce a bid of lower utility for itself. There is a
good reason to do so: the agent’s own utility function is known to the agent. The
other three ways to reciprocate depend on the utility information provided by an
opponent model, which is inherently unreliable.
2.2 Reciprocating and Making Nice Moves
The basic idea of the Tit for Tat strategy is to reciprocate in terms of the agent’s
own utility as described in Sec 2.1, but it also takes into account the utility of its
opponent. To do so, it constructs an opponentmodel using Bayesian learning [4, 5].A Tit for Tat Negotiation Strategy 231
Fig. 1 Four different ways to reciprocate
Using this opponentmodel,a naive implementationof the Tit for Tat strategy would
go as follows:
i. Measure the opponent’sconcession in terms of the agent’s own utility function;
ii. Mirror this bid as describedin Sec 2.1, sacriﬁcing the same amountas is offered
by the opponent;
iii. Make the offer as attractive as possible for the opponent using the Bayesian
opponent model.
However, this implementation would lead to an agent strategy that is far too nice: if
theopponentyields 1
2 utilitytotheagent,thenitwouldrespondinkindbysacriﬁcing
the same amount.In other words:the agentwould be satisﬁed with deals of 1
2 utility.
Given that many domains of ANAC have win–win outcomes with utilities much
higher than that, this is clearly a suboptimal approach.
Therefore, in our version of the agent, it generally aims for more than half, de-
pending on the negotiation scenario. Instead, it uses the opponentmodel to make an
estimate of the location of the Nash point of the negotiation scenario, and then aims
for this outcome (see Fig. 2). For example: if the opponent has made an offer that
is 70% on the way to the Nash point, the agent will respond in kind by approaching
from the other side, making an offer that is 30% away from the Nash point.
2.3 Acceptance Strategy
The preceding sections focused on the bidding strategy of the Tit for Tat agent.
However,there is a second componentof a negotiator’sstrategy that can also highly
inﬂuencetheoutcomeofanegotiation,namelyitsacceptancestrategy.In[2],several
acceptance conditions are deﬁned that are designed to perform well in conjunction232 T. Baarslag, K. Hindriks, and C. Jonker
Fig. 2 The four steps taken by the Tit for Tat bidding strategy to determine the next offer
with an arbitrary bidding strategy. The Nice Tit for Tat agent is equipped with a
particular type of acceptance condition called ACcombi, which the paper shows to
work better than the majority of more simple generic conditions.
The basic idea behind ACcombi is as follows: in case the bidding strategy plans
to propose a deal that is worse than the opponent’s offer, it has reached a consensus
with the opponent and thus accepts the offer. However, if there still exists a gap
between the two offers and time is short, ACcombi waits for an offer that is not
expected to improve in the remaining time.
3 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have provided an overview of the strategy of the Nice Tit for Tat
Agent, which has participated in the ﬁnals of the ANAC2011 competition.
We have designed a new negotiationstrategy based on the well-knownTit for Tat
principle. We have covered both the procedure that our agent follows to select a bid
that reciprocates the play by its opponent,and the way it chooses to accept a certain
negotiation outcome.
As has been found in post-tournament analysis of the ANAC results [3], the Tit
for Tat agent was the only agent in the tournament to match the behavior of the
opponent (which is to be expected). This means it plays tough against hardheaded
negotiators, but it also means it plays nice against strategies that concede easily. It
is observed in the paper that this approach might not be as successful in negotiation
as in some other games, because it does not exploit the conceding strategies enough
to reach the top rankings. More research is required to ﬁnd this delicate balance
between cooperative and competitive behavior of a negotiating agent.A Tit for Tat Negotiation Strategy 233
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